Steiner versus Wittgenstein: Remarks on Differing Views of Mathematical Truth
Abstract
Mark Steiner criticizes some remarks Wittgenstein makes about Gödel. Steiner takes Wittgenstein to be disputing a mathematical result. The paper argues that Wittgenstein does no such thing. The contrast between the realist and the demonstrativist concerning mathematical truth is examined. Wittgenstein is held to side with neither camp. Rather, his point is that a realist argument is inconclusive.
Keywords
Mark Steiner, Gödel, Wittgenstein, Juliet Floyd, realism, mathematical truth, provability
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PDFDOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1387%2Ftheoria.567
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