Email this article Logical Consequence for Nominalists
Abstract
It is often claimed that nominalistic programmes to reconstruct mathematics fail, since they will
at some point involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist.
In this paper we use an idea of Goodman and Quine to develop a nominalistically acceptable explication
of logical consequence.
at some point involve the notion of logical consequence which is unavailable to the nominalist.
In this paper we use an idea of Goodman and Quine to develop a nominalistically acceptable explication
of logical consequence.
Keywords
Philosophy of mathematics, nominalism, logical consequence, inferentialism,
Nelson Goodman, W.V. Quine
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