Expertise and Intuitions about Reference

Edouard Machery

Abstract


Many philosophers hold that experts’ semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people’s intuitions—a thesis commonly called “the Expertise Defense.” Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.


Keywords


intuitions; reference; descriptivism; causal-historical theories; Kripke; expertise; bias; experimental philosophy

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DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1387/theoria.3482

 

 

 

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