Expertise and Intuitions about Reference

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Published 28-01-2012
DOI https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.3482
Edouard Machery
University of Pittsburgh

Abstract

Many philosophers hold that experts' semantic intuitions are more reliable and provide better evidence than lay people's intuitions—a thesis commonly called "the Expertise Defense." Focusing on the intuitions about the reference of proper names, this article critically assesses the Expertise Defense.

How to Cite

Machery, E. (2012). Expertise and Intuitions about Reference. THEORIA. An International Journal for Theory, History and Foundations of Science, 27(1), 37–54. https://doi.org/10.1387/theoria.3482
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Keywords

intuitions, reference, descriptivism, causal-historical theories, Kripke, expertise, bias, experimental philosophy

Issue
Vol. 27 No. 1 (2012)
Section
ARTICLES

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